Science or Security by Strawn, George
 Welcome to the CCoE Webinar Series. Our speaker today is Dr. 
George Strawn. Our host is Jeannette Dopheide. 
The meeting will begin shortly. Participants are muted. You may 
type questions into the chat box during the presentation. 
This meeting is being recorded.
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Science or Security
Outline
• Anecdotes about IT security
• Observations about IT security
• Research for next generation IT security
In the beginning...
• When I broke in to this business, IT security 
meant keeping the machine door locked and 
putting the backup tapes in another building
• Timesharing on big machines and floppy 
disks on small ones complicated IT security, 
but we didn't foresee the future
• The security-free Internet and the Morris 
worm might have warned us
Post-1995
• At a pitac meeting in the late 1990s, a captain of 
industry said, "Our customers want simpler and 
faster networks. Security makes them more 
complicated and slower. The government will 
have to take the lead."
• In 2005, the nitrd program stood up the 
interagency working group, Computer Security 
and Information Assurance (CSIA) 
• The USG as lead customer?
In CIO-land (2003-9)
• I receive assurances that NSF is prepared 
for a virus...
• I am required to name a senior security 
official, I make my best decision and we 
spend our best money
• Privacy joins the party and I become the 
senior privacy official. PII becomes the 
acronym of the day and CIA becomes Cia 
Security and red faces
• Incident one:  NSF-funded computers 
implicated in a major ddos attack. NSF grant to 
Educause to assist universities with security
• Incident two:  Hack attack on a major NSF-
supported facility. NSF grant to initiate the 
series of Security Summits
• Incident three:  Hack attack at South Pole 
Station steals scientific data.  NSF invests more 
in Polar security
Random thoughts 
• Cybersecurity is a little like airport security:  
the first requirements are the appearance of 
and concern about security
• Cybersecurity is a little like the VA:  just 
because it's underfunded is no excuse for not 
doing a perfect job
• The people in charge of cybersecurity should 
keep their necks clean
Observations about 
security
• Security is a system property, where a system is an 
interacting set of components, most of which will be 
subsystems
• It is easy to create insecure systems from secure 
components; it is hard to create secure systems 
from insecure components (but that's the goal)
• IT security (eg, CIA--confidentiality, integrity, 
availability) relates to a system that includes 
hardware, software, human and other components
Perfection?
• Perfect cybersecurity is as likely as zero-
fatality automobile traffic
• Plan for mitigating failures as well as 
preventing them
• Classify failures:  embarrassment, cia, 
financial loss, loss of life (a cps danger)
Risk Management
Likelihood * Damage
Likelihood.  Low.  Medium.  High.                      
Damage
Low.               1.         2.         3. 
Medium.         2.         4.         6. 
High.              3.         6.         9.  
IT insecurity sources
• Software/hardware/human error (eg, 
buffer overflow)
• Insider crime
• Social engineering (eg, phishing)
• Third, third, third or quarter, quarter, half?
Crooks and Espionage 
• Botnets (spam, ddos and key-stroke capture)
• State versus commercial data theft
• Cyberwar
• Ransomware
• Where are scientific facilities in all this?
Doing the Right Things 
vs doing Things Right  
• A dollar spent on security is a dollar less for science?
• Is economizing on cybersecurity false economy?
• Maximal bang for the cybersecurity buck is an 
obvious goal
• Remember the crime novel maxim:  "If you can't do 
the time (suffer the consequences of a particular 
hack), then don't do the crime (of under-investing)"
More random thoughts
• Keep the whole system in focus, not just 
the IT
• Increase time and attention paid to risk 
analysis and mitigation
• Cultivate a bad cop from afar (like OMB 
for the agencies)
NITRD
• An interagency program under OSTP that 
coordinates the IT R&D programs of 20 U.S. 
Federal agencies (check out www.nitrd.gov)
• Over $4 billion annually in agency IT R&D 
investments, including more than $700 million 
in computer security and information 
assurance (CSIA)
Federal Cybersecurity R&D Strategic 
Plan
• Research Themes
– Tailored Trustworthy Spaces
– Moving Target
– Cyber Economic Incentives
– Designed-In Security
• Science of Cyber Security
• Support for National 
Priorities
• Transition to Practice
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Tailored Trustworthy Spaces
• Paradigm
– Supporting context-specific trust decisions
– Basing trust decisions on verifiable assertions
• R&D Program Examples
– Trusted foundation for cyberspace operations [OSD and Service 
Labs]
– High assurance security architectures [NSA, ONR, AFRL, NIST]
– Content and Context Aware Trusted Router (C2TR) [AFRL]
– Information Security Automation Program [NIST, NSA, DHS]
– Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) and Access Control 
Policy Machine [NIST]
– Military Networking Protocol (MNP) program [DARPA]
– High-Level Language Support for Trustworthy Networks [NSF]
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Moving Target
• Paradigm
– Providing resilience through agility
– Continue safe operation in a compromised environment
• R&D Program Examples
– Polymorphic Enclaves and Polymorphic Machines [AFRL]
– Self Regenerative, Incorruptible Enterprise that Dynamically 
Recovers with Immunity [AFRL]
– Clean-slate design of Resilient, Adaptive, Secure Hosts (CRASH) 
[DARPA]
– Mission-Oriented Resilient Clouds [DARPA]
– Cyber Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception [DARPA]
– Morphing Network Assets to Restrict Adversarial Reconnaissance 
(Morphinator) [Army]
– Defensive Enhancements for Information Assurance Technologies 
(DEFIANT) [Army]
– Robust Autonomic Computing Systems [ONR]
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Cyber Economic Incentives
• Paradigm
– Developing understanding of what impacts cyber 
economics
– Providing incentives to good security
• R&D Program Example
– NSF Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace (SaTC) 
Program
• NSF Computer & Information Science & Engineering 
Directorate + NSF Social, Behavioral & Economic 
Sciences Directorate
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Designed-In Security
• Paradigm
– Developing SW systems that are resistant to attacks
– Generating assurance artifacts to attest to the system’s 
capabilities to withstand attacks
• R&D Program Examples
– Survivable Systems Engineering [OSD/SEI CERT]
– Trusted Computing [DARPA, NSA, OSD, NIST]
– Software Development Environment for Secure 
System Software & Applications [ONR] 
– META (flows, tools, and processes for correct-by-
construction system design) [DARPA]
– Software Assurance Metrics And Tool Evaluation 
(SAMATE) [DHS, NIST]
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Supporting 
National Initiatives
• Health IT
• Smart Grid
• Transportation
• Trusted identities
• Cybersecurity education
Science of Security
• Paradigm
– Developing scientific foundations to inform the 
field of cybersecurity
• R&D Program Examples
– AFOSR 2011 Science of Security MURI
• Stanford, Berkeley, Cornell, CMU, U of Penn
– NSA Science of Security Lablets
• UIUC, NC State, CMU
– NSF TRUST Program components
• Berkeley, CMU, Cornell, San Jose SU, Stanford, 
Vanderbilt
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Accelerating Transition to 
Practice
• Currently, a chasm exists between the 
research community and the operations 
community
• Bridging that chasm, commonly referred to as 
the "valley of death," requires cooperative 
efforts and investments by both the R&D and 
operations communities
• CSRI:  Computer Security Research Institute
Next steps
• Assess strategic plan
• Additions and/or deletions
Additions
• Cyberphysical systems
• (IoT)
• Privacy
More random thoughts
• The "science" of cybersecurity is harder 
than previous successes like compilers, 
operating systems, database systems, 
networking, etc
• The escalating war between the good 
guys and the bad guys will continue. 
Cyber science should help the good guys
• Bad publicity helps, but God forbid a 
cyber disaster
Finally
• Because cybersecurity is still an immature 
(and ever-changing) discipline, we see 
through the glass darkly
• Cloud computing has been called the 
industrialization of IT. To what extent might it 
be the industrialization of cybersecurity, too?
 Thank You!
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Questions?
Please take our survey.
 To view presentations, join the discuss mailing list, or 
submit requests to present, visit:
http://trustedci.org/webinars
The next webinar is December 12th at 11am EDT
Topic: CICI Regional Cybersecurity Collaboration projects
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